Hidden in Plain Sight: Kerri S. and Nebraska’s Non-court Child Welfare System by Brock, Claudia W.
Nebraska Law Review 
Volume 99 Issue 4 Article 6 
2021 
Hidden in Plain Sight: Kerri S. and Nebraska’s Non-court Child 
Welfare System 
Claudia W. Brock 
University of Nebraska College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr 
Recommended Citation 
Claudia W. Brock, Hidden in Plain Sight: Kerri S. and Nebraska’s Non-court Child Welfare System, 99 Neb. 
L. Rev. 988 (2020) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol99/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Comment*
Hidden in Plain Sight: Kerri S. and
Nebraska’s Non-court Child Welfare
System
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
A. The Rise of Non-court Involved Cases in Nebraska’s
Child Welfare System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
B. How a Hotline Call Becomes a Non-court Case . . . . . 992
C. Benefits and Pitfalls of Non-court Involved Cases . . 994
D. Circuit Split: When Are Due Process Rights
Triggered in Non-court Arrangements? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
1. Constitutional Due Process Protections and
Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
2. A Broad Approach: Croft v. Westmoreland
County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
3. A Narrow Approach: Dupuy v. Samuels . . . . . . . . 999
III. State v. Kerri S. (In Re Joseph S.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
A. Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
B. Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
C. Nebraska Supreme Court Holding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
D. Analysis of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s
Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005
1. The Nebraska Supreme Court Erred in Rejecting
a Broad Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005
2. The Elevation of Form Over Function . . . . . . . . . . 1007
IV. The Need for Legislative Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Comment in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Claudia W. Brock, J.D., University of Nebraska College of Law, 2021. I wold like
to thank Allison Derr, Sarah Helvey, and Robert McEwen of Nebraska Appleseed
for their mentorship and meaningful work in child welfare policy. I would also
like to thank Sarah O’Neill for her friendship and support. Finally, thank you to
the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, especially Executive Editor Zachary Van Kovering
and Editor-in-Chief Shayna Bartow, for their work in preparing this Comment
for publication.
988
2021] HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 989
A. An Opportunity to Provide Representation to Non-
court Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010
B. Economic Solutions to Prevent the Need for
Engagement with the Child Welfare System . . . . . . . 1012
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012
I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]he attachment between parent and child forms the basis of who
we are as humans . . .”1 Not only is the parent-child relationship so-
cially sacred, it is legally significant. Courts have broadly recognized
that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions as to the
care and custody of their children.2 This right is a protected liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3 As a result, there can be no doubt that due process is owed
whenever the government seeks to separate a parent from his or her
child. Due process principles generally require the right to notice and
a hearing before the state initiates the separation.4 In Nebraska juve-
nile courts, a judge will determine whether the facts of the case fall
within the child abuse and neglect statute,5 and parents have the op-
portunity to respond to the petition by admitting or denying the alle-
gation of maltreatment alleged by the county attorney.6 However, the
possibility also exists that the state may effectuate a familial separa-
tion without the involvement of the juvenile court in a child welfare
case. This arrangement, which curtails due process rights, is a non-
court involved child welfare case.
In Nebraska, following a child abuse and neglect investigation, a
child welfare case progresses down one of three pathways: the case is
filed in juvenile court; the case is closed; or the case is kept open as a
non-court involved case.7 In 2020, the Nebraska Legislature defined a
“non-court involved [case]” as:
1. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing the
testimony of expert witnesses who testified about the primacy of the parent-child
bond).
2. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
4. Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739 (10th Cir. 1997).
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016).
6. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-279.01(1)-(2) (Reissue 2016).
7. For the purposes of this Comment, “non-court involved cases” will refer to volun-
tary cases operating outside of the juvenile court, and not to alternative response
cases. See NEB. APPLESEED, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: A PARENT’S GUIDE TO NON-
COURT CHILD WELFARE CASES (2017), https://neappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/09/AR-KYR-Guide-Final-.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/T248-MAZ5] (noting
that non-court includes the subset of alternative response cases but that not all
non-court cases are alternative response cases); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
712.01 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2018) (codifying definitions, rules, and De-
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[A]n ongoing case opened by the department following a report of child abuse
or neglect in which the department has determined that ongoing services are
required to maintain the safety of a child or alleviate the risk of future abuse
or neglect and in which the family voluntarily engages in child protective ser-
vices without a filing in a juvenile court.
Non-court arrangements allow for increased flexibility and an offering
of family-specific voluntary services, but at what cost? Non-court cases
bypass procedural protections typically provided to a family involved
in juvenile court proceedings.8 While avoiding unnecessary home re-
movals is a noble policy goal, the lack of clarity as to what constitutes
non-court involved cases as well as a lack of regulation and oversight
has increasingly become a cause for concern. Child welfare advocates
and stakeholders have questioned the voluntary nature of non-court
arrangements, the safety of the placements, and the lack of services
and supports provided to children and families in non-court involved
living arrangements. Additionally, because non-court arrangement
terms, standards, and procedures are unclear and uncodified, there is
a risk that parents who “voluntarily” participate in these arrange-
ments without knowing or understanding the implications will unin-
tentionally undermine their own procedural due process protections.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently held that procedural due
process protections only attach for parents in non-court arrangements
when the state causes a familial separation through explicit agency
coercion.9 The Court’s holding is consistent with the narrow approach
of the Sixth10 and Seventh Circuits11 in determining when a family’s
due process rights attach in non-court involved child welfare cases.
This narrow approach may be contrasted with the broader approach of
the Third Circuit,12 which holds that due process protections attach
whenever the state alters the custodial relationship between a parent
and child. This Comment will argue that the broad standard of the
Third Circuit creates stronger protections for families and is easier for
courts to apply. Additionally, a legislative solution is needed to bring
this frequently used practice out of hiding through codification.
Part II of this Comment will provide relevant background informa-
tion including the benefits and detriments of non-court arrangements,
data quantifying their increased use by the state, and a comparison of
partment of Health and Human Services directives for alternative response
cases).
8. Soledad A. McGrath, Differential Response in Child Protection Services: Perpetu-
ating the Illusion of Voluntariness, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 629, 631–32 (2012).
9. State v. Kerri S. (In re Joseph S.), 288 Neb. 463, 470, 849 N.W.2d 468, 474 (2014)
(holding coercion exists when a caseworker improperly threatens to remove a
child from the home as a consequence of non-compliance with agency directives).
10. Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 598 (6th Cir. 2008).
11. Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006).
12. Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d
Cir. 1997).
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both sides of the circuit split regarding when procedural due process
rights attach in non-court settings. Part III will provide the facts and
holding of the recent Nebraska Supreme Court case State v. Kerri S.,
which followed the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ jurisprudence and de-
nied the due process protections the Nebraska Court of Appeals had
previously granted to the parent engaged in a non-court involved child
welfare arrangement.13 Finally, Part IV will propose legislative solu-
tions to provide heightened standards and procedures in non-court
cases.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Non-court Involved Cases in Nebraska’s
Child Welfare System
Only a few years ago, Nebraska removed children from their
homes at a rate twice the national average.14 The goal of reducing the
number of children in the state’s foster care system was first pursued
in 2006 by then Governor Dave Heineman.15 A few years later, a 2008
report from the Department of Health and Human Services (the de-
partment) mentioned the goal of reversing the proportion of out-of-
home to in-home placements of children involved in the state’s child
welfare system; this policy goal became known as “flipping the pyra-
mid.”16 Child welfare advocates cautioned against “flipping the pyra-
mid,” as reform should not be centered on percentages of children
being in one place rather than another.17
Since the goal of “flipping the pyramid” was announced by the de-
partment and the Governor, a flip has indeed occurred. Today the
state has the same number of children involved in non-court arrange-
ments as are involved in child welfare cases formally filed in juvenile
court.18 Despite its shadowy existence in Nebraska statutes and regu-
13. Kerri S., 288 Neb. at 471, 849 N.W.2d at 474.
14. VOICES FOR CHILDREN IN NEB., KIDS COUNT IN NEBRASKA REPORT 9 n.4 (2012)
(noting the U.S. rate of entry into foster care during 2011 was 3.4 children in
every 1000 while Nebraska’s rate between April 2011 and March 2012 was 5.6
children in every 1000); VOICES FOR CHILDREN IN NEB., AN ALTERNATIVE RE-
SPONSE TO CHILD PROTECTION IN NEBRASKA 3 (2017).
15. PERFORMANCE AUDIT COMM., DHHS PRIVATIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE AND JUVE-
NILE SERVICES, Leg. 102-1, 1st Sess., at 29 (Neb. 2011).
16. Id.
17. Nebraska’s Child Welfare Pyramid, VOICES FOR CHILD. NEB. (Oct. 18, 2011),
https://voicesforchildren.com/nebraskas-child-welfare-pyramid/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/49S6-N55T].
18. Floor Debate on LB 1061, 106th Leg., 2d Sess. 38–39 (Neb. 2020) (statement of
Sen. Sue Crawford) (“Over half of our child welfare cases are now noncourt-in-
volved cases, and these have been operating without sufficient statutory or regu-
latory standards.”). It is unclear when the department began using non-court
involved cases. The first Voices for Children in Nebraska Kid’s Count in Ne-
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lations, the department widely effectuates non-court involved cases.19
In 2011, 63% of child welfare cases started with an entry in a court
process, and in 2018, those numbers reversed with 64% of children
entering Nebraska’s child welfare system through a non-court case.20
Child welfare stakeholders have commented on the substantial in-
crease in the use of voluntary cases in recent years.21 The Inspector
General of Nebraska Child Welfare stated that the increase in serving
families through non-court cases instead of court cases contributed to
“an uneasiness permeating across our state regarding the welfare of
children.”22
B. How a Hotline Call Becomes a Non-court Case
To appreciate the distinction between court involved and non-court
involved child welfare cases, one must understand the origins of any
child welfare case. The Department of Health and Human Services is
the state agency that provides children and family services in Ne-
braska.23 The department aims to respond to reports of child mal-
treatment in the least intrusive manner while still providing the
appropriate level of service necessary to meet the needs of the
family.24
braska Report to make note of the practice was the report published in 2009. See
VOICES FOR CHILDREN IN NEB., KIDS COUNT IN NEBRASKA REPORT 16 (2009).
19. Only in the summer of 2020 was “non-court cases” defined by the Nebraska Leg-
islature. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
20. Hearing on LR 239 Before the Health and Human Servs. Comm., 106th Leg., 1st
Sess. 43 (Neb. 2019) (statement of Juliet Summers, Policy Coordinator, Voices for
Children).
21. Hearing on LB 1061 Before the Health and Human Servs. Comm., 106th Leg., 2d
Sess. 32 (Neb. 2020) (statement of Sen. Sue Crawford) (noting “shift toward in-
creased noncourt” cases); Hearing on LR 239, supra note 20, at 8 (statement of
Kim Hawekotte, Director, Foster Care Review Office) (noting a “huge increase in
the state over the last year or two in the use of voluntary services”); id. at 27
(statement of juvenile court J. Roger Heideman) (noting that the juvenile court
has seen a “push towards voluntary cases”).
22. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. OF NEB. CHILD WELFARE, ANNUAL REPORT 2018–2019,
at 3–4 (2019).
23. 390 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 4-010.01 (2018).
24. Id. This mission dovetails with that of the Nebraska juvenile court. See Hearing
on LR 239, supra note 20, at 24 (statement of juvenile court J. Roger Heideman)
(“What our charge is, so to speak, and that we’re to ensure the rights of all
juveniles to the care, protection, and safe and stable living environment to devel-
opment of their capacities for a healthy personality, physical well-being, and use-
ful citizenship, and to protect the public interest. And to achieve that purpose,
then it goes on to say that we’re to maintain the juveniles in their own home
whenever possible, but to separate them when it’s necessary for their health,
safety, and welfare or the paramount concern for that.”).
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Child welfare policy on both a state and national level has long
reflected a singular focus on safety.25 In Nebraska, allegations of child
maltreatment are screened at the Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline for
initial assessment.26 Through this investigation, the department
gathers evidence to determine whether the allegation of child abuse
and neglect is substantiated or unfounded.27 Over 80% of substanti-
ated cases involve physical neglect.28 Physical neglect is defined
under Nebraska law29 as a failure to provide, “necessary food, cloth-
ing, shelter, or care” and is often an indication of economic issues or a
lack of familial resources.30
After a call comes into the department’s Child Abuse and Neglect
Hotline, calls are screened using a structured decision-making tool,
designed to determine the safety and risk involved, and are either ac-
cepted for further assessment by the department or rejected, meaning
no case is opened.31 Following further investigation, a case initially
accepted for further assessment goes down one of three pathways: the
25. AN ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE TO CHILD PROTECTION IN NEBRASKA, supra note 14, at
1.
26. 390 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 4-005–07 (2018).
27. 390 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 4-008.01 (2018) (noting that the department worker
makes a case status determination based on “whether there is credible evidence
to support the finding that child abuse or neglect as defined by state statute has
occurred”). In 2018, there were 36,480 reports of alleged maltreatment made to
the Child Abuse and Neglect Hotline. Of those, 12,808 were assessed and only
2,048 of the total reports were substantiated. See VOICES FOR CHILDREN IN NEB.,
KIDS COUNT IN NEBRASKA REPORT 63 (2019) [hereinafter KIDS COUNT IN NE-
BRASKA 2019 REPORT].
28. KIDS COUNT IN NEBRASKA 2019 REPORT, supra note 27, at 64. After physical neg-
lect, the most common substantiated cases involve physical abuse (14.9%), sexual
abuse (10.7%), emotional abuse (0.5%), and emotional neglect (0.4%). The report
also notes that some children experienced more than one type of maltreatment.
Id.
29. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-710(b)(iii) (Reissue 2016).
30. VOICES FOR CHILDREN IN NEB., KIDS COUNT IN NEBRASKA REPORT 63 (2016) [here-
inafter KIDS COUNT IN NEBRASKA 2016 REPORT].
31. The “Structured Decision Making tool” is a set of research-based decision-support
assessments designed to provide structure for assessing current and future harm
to the child. See NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NEBRASKA CHILD AND
FAMILY SERVICES REVIEW ROUND 3 PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT PLAN 2 (2018). Stan-
dardizing the assessment for harm is critical since, in Nebraska, there is dispro-
portionality in reports of child abuse and neglect with Black youth being 5.7% of
the population and 14.1% of reports, and American Indian youth being 1.1% of
the population but 3.6% of reports. Reports involving Black youth were less likely
than average to be substantiated by the agency or filed in juvenile court. See
VOICES FOR CHILDREN IN NEB., EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW: RACE & ETHNICITY IN
THE FRONT END OF NEBRASKA’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 2–3 (2019) [hereinafter
EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW]. However, some child welfare advocates assert that
the Structured Decision Making tool has a race and class bias. See NAT’L COAL.
FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, NEVER MIND THE DECK CHAIRS, SAVE THE SHIP: HOW TO
SAVE NEBRASKA’S SINKING CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 19 (2012).
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case is filed in juvenile court; the case is closed; or the case is kept
open as a non-court involved case in which the family voluntarily par-
ticipates in child protective services.32 Voluntary cases then go down
one of two pathways: for lower risk cases, alternative responses may
be offered; for higher risk cases, parents may voluntarily agree to par-
ticipate in services offered by the department to avoid engagement
with the juvenile courts.33
C. Benefits and Pitfalls of Non-court Involved Cases
Non-court involved cases represent a trend towards a flexible ap-
proach to child welfare. When there have been allegations of child
maltreatment which pose only a low to moderate risk of harm to the
child, non-court cases allow the state to respond in ways other than
filing a case in the juvenile court.34 Additionally, the ability to provide
voluntary services to parents before having to remove a child from the
home reduces the frequency of familial separation. This is beneficial
for children as traumatic separation from parents creates toxic stress
in children and adolescents that can profoundly impact their develop-
ment.35 This disruption in the development of the nervous system in-
creases the risk for stress-related disease and cognitive impairment
well into adult years.36 Though not all court involved cases result in
the removal of a child, non-court involved arrangements build paren-
tal capacity and maintain family routines and relationships by al-
lowing children to remain in their own homes while their family
receives voluntary services.37
A non-court arrangement relies on a family to voluntarily partici-
pate in agency services beyond the oversight of the juvenile court.38 In
these non-court cases, the state will attempt a more collaborative or
family-focused approach in which the department must create a case
plan that specifies the unique services to be provided to the family.39
32. See Hearing on LB 1061, supra note 21, at 31(statement of Sen. Sue Crawford).
33. See Hearing on LR 239, supra note 20, at 4–5 (statement of Sen. Sara Howard).
34. AN ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE TO CHILD PROTECTION IN NEBRASKA, supra note 14, at
3.
35. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1147 (S.D.
Cal. 2018).
36. Id. (reviewing evidence stating that studies “have shown that children who expe-
rience such traumatic events can suffer from symptoms of anxiety and post-trau-
matic stress disorder, have poorer behavioral and educational outcomes, and
experience higher rates of poverty and food insecurity”).
37. VOICES FOR CHILDREN IN NEB., KIDS COUNT IN NEBRASKA REPORT 70 (2018) (not-
ing the process of removal includes the uprooting of familiar caregivers and sur-
roundings which may create a serious form of traumatic stress for the child with
long-term health and social consequences, leaving the child vulnerable to contin-
ued trauma).
38. NEB. APPLESEED, supra note 7.
39. Id.
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These non-court arrangements appear to be beneficial to all parties
involved: the family volunteers to receive offered services and the
state is able to conserve resources.40 Especially since physical neg-
lect—the cause for the majority of child maltreatment cases in Ne-
braska—may be quickly addressed through voluntary services.41
However, while non-court arrangements allow for increased
agency flexibility, the voluntary nature of the program allows the de-
partment to circumvent legal procedural protections otherwise pro-
vided to parents when a traditional investigatory response triggers
court proceedings.42 Additionally, the degree of parental voluntari-
ness in non-court arrangements may be questionable due to an imbal-
ance of power between the state and the parent, or the use of agency
coercion when removal of the child is threatened.43 The lack of regula-
tory guidelines and procedures for non-court involved cases creates a
legal issue when such cases result in the state removing children from
their homes without the involvement or oversight of the juvenile
court. For example, voluntary placement agreements occur when a
family is involved in a non-court, voluntary case and the department
places their child with a relative or family friend as part of a
caseworker developed safety plan.44 In February 2019, there were
fifty-three children involved in voluntary placement agreements in
40. McGrath, supra note 8, at 633 (explaining that conserved state resources may
then be spent to manage more severe cases of maltreatment, which are most ap-
propriately served by actions that address immediate safety concerns, such as
removal).
41. See AN ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE TO CHILD PROTECTION IN NEBRASKA, supra note
14, at 2 (noting physical neglect is often related to poverty and financial stress);
KIDS COUNT IN NEBRASKA 2016 REPORT, supra note 30, at 63.
42. McGrath, supra note 8, at 636–37 (describing the court’s oversight and protec-
tion, including, “if during the pendency of an investigation a child is removed
from the home, the parent has a right to a judicial hearing to review the agency’s
decision to remove the child”). At this hearing, the agency bears the burden of
proving that there is probable cause to suspect the child has been abused or ne-
glected and that immediate removal was warranted. Id. This procedural protec-
tion ensures that the agency meets its burden of establishing the necessity of the
removal of the child from the home and also allows parents an initial opportunity
to respond to the allegations that brought the family to the attention of the CPS
agency in the first place. Id. Throughout the life of a case, there may also be
several review hearings to help the court monitor the situation. Id.
43. Josh Gupta-Kagan, America’s Hidden Foster Care System, 72 STAN. L. REV. 841,
861 (2020).
44. The Foster Care Review Office refers to these voluntary placement agreements as
“Approved Informal Living Arrangements” (AILAs). References to AILAs will be
found in the Foster Care Review Office’s reports and legislative testimony. See
NEB. FOSTER CARE REVIEW OFFICE, QUARTERLY REPORT 3 (2019). However, be-
cause the Nebraska Court of Appeals and Nebraska Supreme Court use the term
“voluntary placement agreement” in the case of Kerri S., this Comment will use
the same term for clarity.
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Nebraska.45 Children in voluntary placement agreements comprised
15% of the 797 non-court cases opened in Nebraska between July 1,
2018, and June 30, 2019.46
These voluntary placement agreements resemble court-involved
foster care, as custody of the child has been transferred from the par-
ent to another caregiver at the request of the department. It may be
questioned whether non-court involved cases which result in volun-
tary placement agreements are truly voluntary since parents may be
reluctantly agreeing to participate in services when faced with the al-
ternative of the department filing in juvenile court.47 The Foster Care
Review Office (FCRO), an independent state agency responsible for
the oversight of the permanency, safety, and well-being of all children
in out-of-home care in Nebraska, found that in a sample of thirty
mothers who were receiving services through the department, eigh-
teen mothers, or 60%, were either minimally or not at all engaged
with services.48 Of a sample of nine fathers who were receiving ser-
vices through the department, six fathers, or 67%, were likewise mini-
mally or not at all engaged with services.49 Katherine Bass, Research
Director for the FCRO, recently stated to the Nebraska Legislature,
“Most parents do not welcome DHHS or court involvement, so they
feel like they’re getting a great deal . . . The problem is that they lack
the legal knowledge of their rights and options.”50
Most concerning is the lack of procedural due process protections
granted to parents in non-court involved cases. Unlike court involved
cases, non-court cases exist beyond the reach of the juvenile courts
meaning that there is no court oversight as to the appropriateness of
the safety plan, no oversight of unnecessary removals, and no over-
sight of whether there have been reasonable efforts to reunify.51 The
FCRO found that parents are signing legal documents based on infor-
mation from department caseworkers without the time or money to
seek legal advice, or awareness of the importance of such legal ad-
vice.52 In other words, parents are making long-term decisions regard-
45. Id. at 7–8.
46. NEB. ALLIANCE OF CHILD ADVOCACY CTRS., ANNUAL NON-COURT CHILD WELFARE
REPORT 4 (2019).
47. NEB. FOSTER CARE REVIEW OFFICE, supra note 44, at 9 (“One of the most concern-
ing and prominent issues that transpires while reviewing AILA cases is the lack
of real cooperation by parents in many of the cases, calling into question their
voluntary nature.”).
48. Id. (noting that “not engaged with the services” generally means the family did
not elect to participate in the voluntary services provided by the department).
49. Id.
50. Hearing on LB 1061, supra note 21, at 33 (statement of Katherine Bass, Research
Director, Foster Care Review Office).
51. NEB. FOSTER CARE REVIEW OFFICE, supra note 44, at 9.
52. Id.; Hearing on LR 239, supra note 20, at 16 (statement of Kim Hawekotte, Direc-
tor, Foster Care Review Office) (“[Y]ou’re having parents sign documents they
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ing who maintains both legal and physical custody of their children
while relying only on the lay legal advice offered by department
caseworkers.
D. Circuit Split: When Are Due Process Rights Triggered in
Non-court Arrangements?
Because non-court arrangements have the potential to interfere
with the constitutionally protected parent-child relationship, ensuring
procedural due process is essential. While serving families outside the
constraints of the juvenile court system can be an effective way to pro-
vide early intervention, flexible non-court arrangements side-step pro-
cedural protections that are triggered by court proceedings.
1. Constitutional Due Process Protections and Fundamental
Rights
Any state action that interferes with parental authority over chil-
dren or alters the parent-child relationship raises issues of due pro-
cess. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that
parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control
over their children.53 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding
parental rights dates back nearly a century, and courts have also rec-
ognized that fundamental liberty rights extend to both parents and
children in their familial relationship.54 In an effort to safeguard
these fundamental rights, the Supreme Court and state actors have
adopted familial due process protections.55 These due process rights
are evidenced in states’ child welfare agency procedures, such as the
inquiry a state must launch when investigating whether a parent is
unfit or whether to remove a child from the home.56 However,  par-
ents’ right to the care, custody, and control over their children is not
don’t even know what it is they’re signing or what it is they’re doing, they have
not been told. I think that for case managers has to be difficult for them because
you’re giving legal advice as to sign this document and then your kid, child can go
live over here. There are no attorneys involved in any voluntary case. It is strictly
the department and the, and the family.”).
53. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000).
54. Id. at 65; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 758–59 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
55. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649 (holding parents were entitled to a “hearing on [their]
fitness as a parent before [their] children were taken from [them]”); In re Juvenile
Appeal, 455 A.2d 1313, 1319–20 (Conn. 1983) (holding that because of the funda-
mental interest a parent has in raising their children, a showing of serious physi-
cal illness, serious physical injury, or immediate physical danger must be
demonstrated before children may be removed from a family).
56. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 43, at 866.
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absolute and must be balanced against the state’s interest in ensuring
the safety and health of children.57
While formal foster care includes constitutionally required court
hearings and judicial oversight, non-court foster care avoids these
hearings. But, like formal foster care, involvement in non-court foster
care can lead to the state separating a parent from his or her child.
The issue of whether procedural due process protections must accom-
pany this familial separation turns on the voluntariness of parents
participating in a non-court arrangement with the state.58 If the state
coerces parents in a non-court arrangement through unjustifiable
threats to remove the children or initiate court proceedings against
the parent, then no voluntary choice exists, and the state has acted
unconstitutionally.59 However, if the arrangement between the parent
and the state is truly voluntary, then no violation of the Due Process
Clause has occurred.60 The federal circuits are split by the question of
whether a state’s legally justifiable threats to remove a child from the
home are so coercive by their nature that they make any subsequent
“voluntary” agreement by the parent to enter into a non-court ar-
rangement essentially involuntary.61
2. A Broad Approach: Croft v. Westmoreland County
The Third Circuit has held that procedural due process rights must
apply when parents enter an agreement with the state that separates
the parents from their children.62 Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children
& Youth Servs. involved a state agency investigation into whether the
Crofts were abusing their four-year-old daughter after a vague report
was made to a child protection hotline.63 The Crofts denied the abuse
and offered an explanation for their daughter’s behavior, but the
agency investigator presented Mr. Croft with “an ultimatum.”64 Mr.
Croft could either leave his home and voluntarily separate himself
from his daughter for the duration of the investigation, or his child
would be removed from her home and placed in foster care.65
57. Tara Grigg Garlinghouse & Scott Trowbridge, Child Well-Being in Context, 18 U.
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 105, 108 (2015).
58. Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We’ll Take Your Child: The Parents’ Fictional




61. Ryan C. F. Shellady, Note, Martinis, Manhattans, and Maltreatment Investiga-
tions: When Safety Plans Are a False Choice and What Procedural Protections
Parents Are Due, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1613, 1628 (2019).
62. Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d
Cir. 1997).
63. Id. at 1124.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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The Third Circuit held the state agency had acted beyond its legal
authority by removing the child absent evidence beyond an anony-
mous phone call to a tip line.66 However, the holding of the court went
beyond examining the authority necessary for state actors to effectu-
ate a family separation.67 Croft also held that there can be no volun-
tary non-court arrangement when an agency threat to remove a child
has occurred. While the state agency repeatedly characterized the fa-
ther’s decision to leave the home as voluntary, the Third Circuit found
the caseworker’s ultimatum was coercive, and the defendant’s at-
tempts to color the father’s decision as voluntary were “not well
taken.”68
Following district court cases in the Third Circuit have expanded
the holding in Croft to regard any non-court child welfare arrange-
ment which results from a state agency’s threat to remove a child as
coercive. For example, Starkey v. York County held that coercing par-
ents to enter into a non-court arrangement with the implicit threat
that the agency will initiate an emergency removal raises procedural
due process concerns.69 Starkey is distinguishable from Croft in that
the facts of Starkey included significantly more evidence of alleged
abuse and neglect.70 The variety of case facts further illustrates that
the Third Circuit’s holding is not dependent on the strength of the
state’s evidence of maltreatment.71 Thus, in the Third Circuit, proce-
dural due process rights apply whenever parents enter into an ar-
rangement with a governmental entity which creates a family
separation.
Additionally, the trial court in Starkey expressly rejected the hold-
ing of the Seventh Circuit, discussed below, which examines how coer-
cive the voluntary agreement is to determine whether due process
rights attach.72 Courts in the Third Circuit have interpreted Croft to
reject any argument that voluntary non-court arrangements entered
under threats to remove a child were not “blatantly coercive.”73
3. A Narrow Approach: Dupuy v. Samuels
In contrast to the broad holding of the Third Circuit, the Seventh
Circuit held in Dupuy v. Samuels that procedural due process rights
are not triggered unless a parent has been “coerced” to enter into a
66. Id. at 1126–27.
67. Id. at 1127.
68. Id. at 1125 n.1.
69. Starkey v. York Cty., No. 1:11-cv-00981, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157646, at *20
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2011).
70. Id. at *2–5, *8.
71. Id. at *9.
72. Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006).
73. Starkey, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157646, at *22.
1000 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:988
non-court arrangement resulting in the child being placed out of the
home.74 Without coercion by the state, there is insufficient state inter-
ference to merit due process protections.75 Dupuy was a class action
suit filed by parents which challenged a range of practices used by the
Illinois child-welfare agency that allegedly infringed on parental
rights protected by the due process clause.76 Like Croft, Dupuy in-
volved non-court arrangements which led to family separations. How-
ever, the Seventh Circuit determined that non-court arrangements
are the result of voluntary choices by the parent and that engagement
in this non-court arrangement is merely an offer of an alternative to
juvenile court.77
The holding of the Seventh Circuit differs from that of the Third
Circuit in that the Seventh Circuit held that legitimate or well-evi-
denced threats to remove the child or to involve the juvenile court are
not coercive.78 It is only if the state agency lacks the factual basis or
evidentiary findings to make a threat to a parent that the parent’s
subsequent agreement to a non-court arrangement can be character-
ized as coercive.79 The court distinguished legitimate legal threats
from objectionable state coercion on the basis of whether a threat is
unjustifiable.80
Other federal courts have ruled similarly including the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Smith v. Williams-Ash.81 Following concerns articulated by the
state that the Smiths’ home was too dirty and cluttered to be a safe
place for children, a social worker persuaded the Smiths to enter into
a non-court arrangement which resulted in the removal of their chil-
dren.82 The Smiths stated that they promptly cleaned their home and
inquired about additional measures they should take in order to be
reunited with their children, but that the state official ignored the
parents’ request for additional information and threatened to perma-
nently remove their children if they stopped abiding by their volun-
tary non-court agreement.83 The state allowed the Smith children to
return to the custody of their parents only after the parents filed a
federal lawsuit alleging a due process violation.84
74. Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 760.
75. Id. at 763.
76. Id. at 758.
77. Id. at 760.
78. Id. at 763.
79. Id. at 762; see also Gupta-Kagan, supra note 43, at 863 (noting there is no consid-
eration by the Seventh Circuit as to whether it is reasonable to expect parents to
evaluate the legitimacy of a state agency threat to remove their children).
80. Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 762.
81. Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 598.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 599.
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In the opinion of the Sixth Circuit, the lower court relied heavily on
form language involved in the voluntary agreement between the state
and the Smiths.85 The Sixth Circuit followed the reasoning in Dupuy
and determined that the custody change was a voluntary choice by the
parents, and therefore, procedural due process rights did not attach.86
III. STATE V. KERRI S. (IN RE JOSEPH S.)
Nebraska courts had not ruled on when procedural due process
must be provided to parents who are participating in a non-court in-
volved child welfare case until the case of Kerri S. in 2014.87 Kerri S.
was a case of first impression for the Nebraska Supreme Court, and
its opinion aligned Nebraska courts with the narrow approach utilized
by the Seventh Circuit in Dupuy and the Sixth Circuit in Ash. The
case concerned a non-court involved child welfare case in which a par-
ent entered an arrangement with the state without the involvement or
oversight of the juvenile court. Specifically, the agreement between
the parent and the department resulted in the removal of the children
from the parent’s custody and also required the parent to participate
in services provided by the state and its contractor, the Nebraska
Families Collaborative (NFC), which included testing for controlled
substances.88
A. Facts
Kerri is the biological mother of three children: Joseph S., born in
January 2000; William S., born in November 2005; and Steven S.,
born in December 2006.89 In March 2009, the department took notice
of Kerri and her children due to concerns about Kerri’s drug use and
improper supervision of the children.90 Shortly after Melissa Mise-
gadis, a family permanency supervisor with NFC, became involved in
the case, the children entered foster care where they remained for one
year.91 Kerri received drug testing and mental health services while
her children were in foster care.92 Misegadis testified that Kerri did
not always consistently participate in services offered by the depart-
ment, but that Kerri completed a court-ordered and court-monitored
85. Id. at 598 (noting that such agreement stated that the “decision to sign this
safety plan is voluntary” and that “[i]f you cannot or will not be able to continue
following the plan, [CPS] may have to take other action(s) to keep your child(ren)
safe”).
86. Id. at 600.
87. State v. Kerri S. (In re Joseph S.), 288 Neb. 463, 849 N.W.2d 468 (2014).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 464, 849 N.W.2d at 471.
90. Id. at 465, 849 N.W.2d at 471.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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plan.93 Kerri’s children were returned to her care and the case was
closed in November 2011 after being open for thirty-two months.94
In January 2012, the department received reports that Kerri was
once again not properly supervising her children.95 Kerri entered into
a voluntary agreement with the department and the case was trans-
ferred to NFC.96 Kerri’s voluntary services included drug testing and
placing her children in temporary foster care for a period of 180
days.97 NFC asserted that during this period Kerri was not consistent
in participating in weekly visitation or attending therapy sessions.98
Kerri’s scheduled drug testing also resulted in positive readings dur-
ing this period.99
An NFC specialist conducted a drop-in visit to Kerri’s home before
the children were to return.100 The specialist testified that she found
the home in disarray and five non-familial adults appeared to be resid-
ing in the home.101 NFC then requested that the department be
granted temporary custody of Kerri’s children.102 On August 9, 2012,
the State filed a motion for temporary custody. The juvenile court
granted the department temporary custody of the children the same
day.103
B. Procedural History
In December 2012, the State filed an amended petition. Counts I
and II of the amended petition alleged that the children were at risk of
harm due to Kerri’s drug use, failure to participate in voluntary ser-
vices, failure to provide safe housing, and failure to provide proper
parental care.104 Counts III and IV alleged that Kerri had refused to
give the children necessary parental care and protection, and sought
termination of Kerri’s parental rights.105
The juvenile court held a hearing on March 13, 2013.106 Kerri
moved to dismiss after the State presented evidence.107 The court de-













105. Id. at 466, 849 N.W.2d at 471–72.
106. Id. at 466, 849 N.W.2d at 472.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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motion to dismiss as to counts III and IV, after finding the State failed
to present a prima facie case.109 The juvenile court ordered the chil-
dren to remain in the department’s temporary custody.110 The State
appealed, arguing it had proved by clear and convincing evidence that
Kerri’s parental rights should be terminated because Kerri had sub-
stantially and continuously neglected her children and refused to pro-
vide necessary parental care, and that termination was in the
children’s best interests.111
The Court of Appeals found that Kerri had been denied due process
of law and therefore held that Kerri’s noncompliance during the vol-
untary phase of the case was not acceptable evidence to satisfy the
requirements of a termination of parental rights.112 The Court of Ap-
peals noted that this was a case of first impression, as Nebraska
courts had not previously considered any cases where the removal of
children and the subsequent petition to terminate parental rights
stemmed from a voluntary agreement.113 The court also stated that
due process law is well established and can thus be used to examine
the “nuances of a voluntary basis agreement.”114
The Court of Appeals determined that the Nebraska Juvenile Code
explicitly provides due process protections for both parents and chil-
dren and that, based on the record, there was little evidence that
Kerri or her children were afforded due process during the voluntary
phase of the case.115 Because the voluntary placement agreement was
not entered into evidence, the Court of Appeals was unable to deter-
mine whether Kerri was made aware that the state’s concern about
her alleged drug use and alleged inability to provide a safe environ-
ment for the children placed them at risk for harm.116 There was no
evidence to show that Kerri was advised to consult with an attorney
regarding the implications of a voluntary placement of her children’s
custody with the state.117 The record was also unclear as to whether




112. Id. at 467, 849 N.W.2d at 472.
113. State v. Kerri S. (In re Joseph S.), 21 Neb. App. 706, 707, 842 N.W.2d 209, 211
(2014), rev’d, 288 Neb. 463, 849 N.W.2d 468 (2014).
114. Id. at 713, 842 N.W.2d at 215.
115. Id. at 714, 842 N.W.2d at 215; NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-246(7) (Cum. Supp. 2012)
(stating the Nebraska Juvenile Code provides such due process protections for
both parents and children; the code specifically cites that it is to “provide a judi-
cial procedure through which these purposes and goals are accomplished and en-
forced in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional
and other legal rights are recognized and enforced”).
116. Kerri S., 21 Neb. App. at 714, 842 N.W.2d at 215.
117. Id.
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children at any point during the 180-day voluntary period.118 Addi-
tionally, there was no evidence that Kerri was represented by an at-
torney during the voluntary period or consulted with an attorney prior
to voluntarily participating in services, there was no hearing in which
Kerri could address or refute the allegations before an impartial deci-
sionmaker, nor was Kerri made aware that entering into a voluntary
agreement could result in evidence of her level of compliance with the
agreement that could then be used to terminate her parental
rights.119
The Court of Appeals concluded that Kerri was denied due process
as the voluntary placement agreement circumvented the established
statutory process for removal and petitions for termination of parental
rights.120 Because Kerri’s compliance during the voluntary basis pe-
riod was not acceptable evidence to be used to satisfy the statutory
requirements necessary to terminate her parental rights, the State
had failed to present a prima facie case.121 The Nebraska Supreme
Court then granted the State’s petition for further review.122
C. Nebraska Supreme Court Holding
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and
held that Kerri had been afforded due process protections during the
voluntary phases of her case.123 The Court agreed that the use of coer-
cive tactics by the department could trigger due process requirements,
but the Court found no due process violations in the case.124
The Court examined the Third Circuit’s holding in Croft, noting
the court’s emphasis of the fact that the caseworker lacked objectively
reasonable grounds for believing any abuse had occurred when hold-
ing the caseworker’s ultimatum violated the father’s rights.125 The
Court also discussed Starkey, in which a Third Circuit district court
found a procedural due process violation after another ultimatum of-
fered by the state.126 The Court distinguished these two Third Circuit
cases with Kerri’s case by noting that Kerri was not given an ultima-
tum when the state first offered voluntary services in 2012.127 The
Court linked state ultimatums and coercion, and because the record
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 715, 842 N.W.2d at 216.
121. Id.
122. State v. Kerri S. (In re Joseph S.), 288 Neb. 463, 849 N.W.2d 468 (2014).
123. Id. at 471, 849 N.W.2d at 475; Kerri S., 21 Neb. App. at 715, 842 N.W.2d at 216.
124. Kerri S., 288 Neb. at 471, 849 N.W.2d at 475.
125. Id. at 469, 849 N.W.2d at 474.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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did not evidence an ultimatum, the Court held that the state had not
employed coercive tactics.128
The Court contrasted the holdings of the Third Circuit with that of
the Seventh Circuit. In Dupuy, the Seventh Circuit found no due pro-
cess violation where parents had their children placed out of the home
without being afforded a hearing.129 The Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged in its holding that while any threat of formal removal proceed-
ings may be slightly coercive in nature, it is not enough to invalidate a
parent’s consent to participate in a non-court arrangement. The Court
also noted that the Sixth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit in Smith.130
The Nebraska Supreme Court found the reasoning of the Seventh
and Sixth Circuits to be persuasive and concluded there was no evi-
dence in the record demonstrating Kerri was coerced into voluntary
services by NFC.131 The Court noted the state did not seek to termi-
nate Kerri’s parental rights based on her failure to comply with volun-
tary state-offered services.132 Rather, the state sought to terminate
Kerri’s parental rights based on the evidence that Kerri had “substan-
tially and continuously or repeatedly neglected and refused to give
necessary parental care and protection.”133 The Court held that the
State made a prima facie case for the termination of Kerri’s parental
rights and remanded the case to juvenile court to consider the evi-
dence presented and determine if a termination of Kerri’s parental
rights was in the best interests of her children.134
D. Analysis of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s Opinion
The Nebraska Supreme Court failed to provide procedural due pro-
cess protections to parents participating in a non-court arrangement
by limiting the circumstances under which these protections attach.
This standard will require a fact-intensive inquiry into the circum-
stances of the state-effectuated familial separation and ignores the
practical realities and challenges of families engaged in the child wel-
fare system.
1. The Nebraska Supreme Court Erred in Rejecting a Broad
Approach
The line of cases from the Third Circuit rightly hold that non-court




131. Id. at 471, 849 N.W.2d at 474.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 471, 849 N.W.2d at 475.
134. Id.
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ration of a child from his or her parent must be accompanied by proce-
dural due process protections. Additionally, these cases present a
more realistic and practical analysis than the approach advanced by
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. The approach used by the Third Cir-
cuit better appreciates the realities of the parent-state relationship in
non-court settings and more easily applies to a variety of cases and
circumstances.135
The approach taken by the Third Circuit strikes a better balance
between protecting the parent-child relationship, providing clear gui-
dance to state agencies regarding how to administer non-court in-
volved cases in a constitutional way, and supporting judicial efficiency
in the review of these cases. In contrast, the approach articulated by
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits requires an in-depth factual analysis
of the language used by caseworkers and the factual circumstances
related to how the state separated a parent and child.136 This ap-
proach is flawed for two reasons. First, the Sixth and Seventh Cir-
cuits’ approach elevates form over substance and ignores the impact a
“voluntary” arrangement has on a parent’s relationship with his or
her child. Second, the approach fails to consider the reality of the situ-
ation when a state caseworker arrives at a family’s home and informs
the parent that a court action could be filed against the parent if he or
she does not agree to allow a state actor to place his or her child
outside of the home. When the state arrives at a home or meets with a
parent, it is reasonable for the parent to assume that the state’s ac-
tions are grounded in proper legal authority. Even if the services or
the out-of-home placement suggested by the state are presented to the
parent as voluntary, a parent is likely to perceive his or her compli-
ance as mandatory.
135. Inequities exist in the frequency of reporting, the administration of services, and
the response time of agency caseworkers for families of color and families living
in poverty. See EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW, supra note 31 (noting children of mi-
nority groups are more likely to be the subject of maltreatment reports to the
state’s child abuse and neglect hotline). Maltreatment reports made about Black
children were the least likely to result in a finding that the parents were abusive
or neglectful but were the most likely to be recommended for interventions by the
state. Id. Poverty is frequently mistaken for neglect, resulting in increased rates
of child maltreatment reports for low-income families. Id. Because of disparate
treatment by the state and in the services offered, a broad application of due
process protections would allow families to maintain their constitutional rights
regardless of circumstance. See generally Gupta-Kagan, supra note 43, at 843
(noting that a parent’s education level, income, and language proficiency may
contribute to an imbalance of power in the parent-state relationship).
136. See Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 598 (6th Cir. 2008) (reporting form
language threatening that should parents “not be able to continue following the
plan, [CPS] may have to take other action(s) to keep your child(ren) safe”); Dupuy
v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating coercion is dependent on
legally unjustifiable threats from a caseworker to be determined by the facts and
circumstances of each case).
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Child welfare agencies are only permitted to suggest action to par-
ents to address child maltreatment concerns when there is a low level
well-being concern that does not rise to a safety threat requiring the
involvement of the juvenile court.137 Suggestion of action and offering
of voluntary services may also occur in instances where there is a re-
port of abuse or neglect that has not been substantiated by the
agency.138 In these cases, an agency official should make it clear to
parents that the recommendations and suggestions are not
mandatory.
Should a state caseworker not make it clear that the recommenda-
tions are merely suggestions, the offering of voluntary services when
there are no serious safety concerns for the child may raise the ques-
tion of whether “voluntary services” are in fact voluntary.139 Parents
may reasonably believe that their compliance with agency recommen-
dations is required to keep their children or that noncompliance may
result in an agency filing a petition in juvenile court.
2. The Elevation of Form Over Function
In Dupuy v. Samuels, the Seventh Circuit analogized the offering
of a safety plan to both a prosecutor’s offer of a plea agreement and an
interim agreement in a tort settlement.140 The court reasoned that in
all of these instances the outcome would be more beneficial if the indi-
vidual accepted the offer, but acceptance is not required.141 However,
it should be highlighted that non-court involved foster care cases can-
not be analogized to other civil cases as they involve the fundamental
liberty interest of parental rights over children. Furthermore, the only
check on an overzealous state agency is a parent’s willingness to risk
the removal of the child, say “no,” and insist on a day in court, which is
an unlikely path of recourse.142
Additionally, this decision of a parent to refuse voluntary services
should be examined in both its legal and social context. In the Dupuy
opinion, Judge Posner flippantly suggested that a parent accepting or
rejecting the offer of a safety plan is no different than having a choice
in cocktails:
We cannot see how parents are made worse off by being given the option of
accepting the offer of a safety plan. It is rare to be disadvantaged by having
more rather than fewer options. If you tell a guest that you will mix him either
a Martini or a Manhattan, how is he worse off than if you tell him you’ll mix
him a Martini?143
137. Garlinghouse & Trowbridge, supra note 57, at 116–17.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 763.
141. Id.
142. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 43, at 861.
143. Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 762.
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This line in the opinion has been rightly criticized for its condescen-
sion, and it underscores the Seventh Circuit’s assumption that par-
ents have the legal foresight to know whether agency investigators
have substantiated claims and may initiate removal proceedings.144
Parents engaged in the foster care system in any capacity are often
legally unsophisticated and are trapped in a situation with unequal
bargaining power.145 In practice, few parents are willing to gamble
with their parental rights, especially in instances where they are be-
ing asked to sign safety plans or consent to voluntary services on the
spot.
Non-court involved cases are not cocktail parties. The two actors,
parents and agency officials, have grossly unequal positions of power.
Parents involved in child welfare cases are typically without counsel
and often of low socioeconomic status and low social capital.146 Other
factors such as a parent’s disability, immigration status, or language
barrier may reinforce the existing power imbalance. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, in its opinion, was greatly reductive when it analogized the safety
plan agreement to other civil offers or a cocktail party. In instances of
non-court involved cases there is usually no negotiation due to the
fundamentally coercive relationship between parents and agency offi-
cials. An agreement is only voluntary if the other party believes they
have an option. Whether parents have an actual option is beyond the
point if, for practical purpose, parents are unaware of their due pro-
cess protections and their ability to refuse without repercussions.
The Nebraska Supreme Court should adopt the standard articu-
lated by the Third Circuit: all non-court involved arrangements in
which the government effectuates the separation of a child from a par-
ent must be accompanied by procedural due process protections. This
standard is consistent with the holding of the Nebraska Court of Ap-
peals: that Kerri was denied her procedural due process rights be-
cause the voluntary placement agreement circumvented the
established statutory process for removal and petitions for termina-
tion of parental rights.147
144. Shellady, supra note 61, at 1628 (“The Seventh Circuit’s Dupuy opinion lacks
empathy and understanding. By comparing a high-pressure, emotional situation
(like a parent being forced to choose who gets their child when the government
takes the child away) to a low-stakes, routine decision (like one’s drink of choice),
the Seventh Circuit revealed how easy it is for our legal system to become blinded
by legal technicalities at the expense of human compassion.”).
145. VOICES FOR CHILDREN IN NEB., KIDS COUNT IN NEBRASKA REPORT 65 (2017) (“The
majority of children who come into Nebraska’s child welfare system are identified
because their family is unable to meet their basic needs, which is often related to
symptoms of poverty.”).
146. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 43, at 843.
147. State v. Kerri S. (In re Joseph S.), 21 Neb. App. 706, 713, 842 N.W.2d 209, 215
(2014), rev’d, 288 Neb. 463, 849 N.W.2d 468 (2014).
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Regardless of how such an arrangement is characterized, whether
it be as voluntary, coercive, a safety plan, or a voluntary placement
agreement, the effect of the arrangement is the same for the family. In
all these scenarios, a state actor has inserted itself into, and interfered
with, the family’s constitutionally protected relationship. In many of
these cases, parents may not be aware of their rights, their ability to
have their children returned to them, or their ability to be heard and
challenge an aspect of the state’s case plan or the state’s legal basis for
interfering in the parent-child relationship. Therefore, procedural due
process protections should be provided to parents who are involved in
non-court involved child welfare cases, particularly when those ar-
rangements result in the out-of-home placement of their children.
IV.  THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
Meaningful non-court involved procedures are necessary to protect
the constitutional right to family integrity. For years, Nebraska’s Fos-
ter Care Review Office has recommended the establishment of “clear
and concise policy and procedures” for non-court involved child wel-
fare cases.148 Recently, non-court cases gained initial legislative legiti-
macy with the passage of Senator Sue Crawford’s Legislative Bill (LB)
1061 in the summer of 2020.149 The Bill was the product of a broad
coalition of child welfare stakeholders including the FCRO, child advo-
cacy centers, non-profit groups, provider groups, county attorneys,
and the department.150 Senator Crawford acknowledged that “[o]ver
half of our child welfare cases are now non-court-involved cases or al-
ternative response cases, and these have been operating without suffi-
cient statutory or regulatory standards”; therefore, there was a need
for statutory parameters as a means to protect children engaged in
non-court cases.151
The law established by LB 1061 provides a definition for non-court
cases, the first definition of “non-court” to exist anywhere in Nebraska
statutes or department regulations.152 The law also details proce-
dures for processing reports and investigations for non-court cases
and requires the department to provide written notice of rights to all
parents engaged in a non-court involved case.153 Additionally, it ex-
plicitly outlines parents’ rights when their children are in voluntary
placements.154 The department is also required by the law to promul-
148. NEB. FOSTER CARE REVIEW OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2018–2019, at xvi (2019).
149. LB 1061, 106th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2020) (codified as amended at NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-713.02 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
150. Hearing on LB 1061, supra note 21, at 32 (statement of Sen. Sue Crawford).
151. Id.
152. Id.; see 390 NEB. ADMIN. CODE (2018).
153. Hearing on LB 1061, supra note 21, at 33 (statement of Sen. Sue Crawford).
154. Id.
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gate rules and regulations for any department action in a non-court
involved case. This is a necessary requirement as nowhere in the de-
partment’s child welfare regulations is the word “non-court” used.155
Promulgation of non-court regulations is an essential step in protect-
ing the rights of parents and children in non-court arrangements as
procedures will be clarified and the authority of the department
cabined. However, the department has historically demonstrated an
unwillingness to create and maintain robust child welfare regulations,
so the Legislature must ensure this directive from LB 1061 is carried
out.156
A. An Opportunity to Provide Representation to Non-court
Families
Some child welfare advocates have questioned whether a rights no-
tification provided by the department is sufficient to protect the legal
rights of parents. Counsel is critical for parents to effectively navigate
voluntary services, especially when a voluntary placement agreement
is created.157 Knowledge of substantive legal standards necessary to
determine whether the factual and legal basis for the threat of re-
moval exists would equalize the power imbalance between parents
and the department.158 Additionally, legal representation typically
enhances a parent’s engagement and leads to more individualized case
plans.159 Recent studies demonstrate that when a non-court involved
155. 390 NEB. ADMIN. CODE (2018) (nowhere in the twelve chapters of administrative
code for Child Welfare and Juvenile Services is the word “non-court” used); see
also Hearing on LR 239, supra note 20, at 36 (statement of Sarah Helvey, Child
Welfare Program Director, Nebraska Appleseed) (noting there is no statute on
non-court involved cases; “there’s no statutory authority, nor is there any regula-
tory guidance, to guide decision making in these cases that involve thousands of
children who previously had the protection oversight of juvenile court”).
156. In 2019, the department proposed repealing nearly 200 pages of child welfare
regulations, to be replaced by less than twelve pages of department policies and
practices. See Martha Stoddard, Foes Slam HHS Proposal to Repeal Bulk of Ne-
braska’s Child Welfare Regulations, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://www.omaha.com/news/nebraska/foes-slam-hhs-proposal-to-repeal-bulk-
of-nebraska-s/article_1e810301-bd24-517c-9415-ecdf1da20ee4.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/D7UE-AVJS] (comparing regulations, which must go through a
public process to be approved, to policies and practices, which may be changed
more frequently by DHHS and without public consideration); JoAnne Young, Ad-
vocates Raise Red Flag on Proposed Repeal of Majority of Nebraska Child Welfare




157. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 43, at 902.
158. Id.
159. Id. (describing that the Children’s Bureau, a federal agency organized under the
United States Department of Health and Human Services’ Administration for
Children and Families, has found that legal counsel enhances parents’ engage-
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parent has legal counsel, reunification occurs more quickly, time in
the child welfare system is reduced, and the safety of the child is not
compromised.160
During a Health and Human Services Committee hearing, child
welfare advocates recommended Nebraska examine the opportunity
under the Family First Act to draw down federal funding for legal rep-
resentation for both parents and children involved in non-court
cases.161 This reform would open the door to significant increases in
funding for parent and child representation. New federal funding cov-
ers 50% of the cost of representation in eligible cases.162 Families who
come to the attention of the child welfare system deserve to be sup-
ported and have their rights protected. Advocates have said that legal
representation in non-court cases would, “go a long way to ameliorat-
ing some of our concerns.”163
ment in case planning and leads to more individualized plans). Gupta-Kagan also
supposes that similar benefits to the quality of safety plans, including accuracy of
department findings and specificity of safety plans, may be expected with access
to counsel.
160. Id. at 903 (citing Lucas A. Gerber et al., Effects of an Interdisciplinary Approach
to Parental Representation in Child Welfare, 102 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 42,
42 (2019); Mark E. Courtney & Jennifer L. Hook, Evaluation of the Impact of
Enhanced Parental Legal Representation on the Timing of Permanency Outcomes
for Children in Foster Care, 34 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1337, 1338, 1340–42
(2012)).
161. Hearing on LR 239, supra note 20, at 38 (statement of Sarah Helvey, Child Wel-
fare Program Director, Nebraska Appleseed); id. at 44 (statement of Juliet Sum-
mers, Policy Coordinator, Voices for Children). The Children’s Bureau expanded
IV-E funding eligibility in 2019 to include legal representation for parents.
Through the January 2019 guidance, the Children’s Bureau determined that pro-
viding independent legal representation by an attorney for both children and par-
ents qualifies as an expenditure necessary for the administration of state services
and so was entitled to one-half reimbursement. Federal funding is available both
to children subject to an open family court case and those who are “candidates”
for foster care, and a child subject to a non-court involved case seems to fit in the
statutory definition of a foster care “candidate.” Thus, the new Children’s Bureau
guidance establishes that federal funds may support the provision of counsel to
the parents of children involved in non-court cases. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL § 8.1B(30)
(2019).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 674(a)(3) (2018).
163. Hearing on LR 239, supra note 20, at 44 (statement of Juliet Summers, Policy
Coordinator, Voices for Children).
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B. Economic Solutions to Prevent the Need for Engagement
with the Child Welfare System
Finally, it is necessary to consider how the state can better prevent
families from entering the child welfare system in the first place.164
Since the leading cause of child maltreatment in the state is directly
linked to poverty, it is worth considering how the state can provide
economic support to under resourced families.165 Nebraska ranks
near the bottom of states in terms of direct economic assistance for
families in poverty.166 Making reforms to Nebraska’s economic assis-
tance programs might be the optimal way to alleviate incoming ten-
sions in the child welfare system. To start, Nebraska should direct
more funds from the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) grant to provide direct cash assistance to families. Addition-
ally, the gross income eligibility threshold within the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) should be raised to allow people
who are utilizing SNAP to take higher paying jobs without losing
more in nutrition assistance than gained in new income.167 Applica-
tion processes should be simplified to combat the state’s overreliance
on imposing sanctions for noncompliance with program require-
ments.168 Investment in a robust array of economic assistance is an
effective way to prevent a family from entering the child welfare sys-
tem. Providing economic stability to families returns power to the par-
ents and reduces the need for engagement in “voluntary” services.
V. CONCLUSION
Because non-court involved child welfare cases are commonplace in
Nebraska and such arrangements may lead to a child being placed
164. See Sarah Helvey et al., Universal Mandatory Reporting of Suspected Child
Abuse and Neglect in Nebraska: Current Law and Future Considerations, NEB.
L., July 2020, at 15.
165. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
166. State and Local General Expenditures, Per Capita, TAX POL’Y CTR. (June 18,
2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-and-local-general-expendi-
tures-capita [https://perma.unl.edu/D3MZ-FJ2Z]. Currently Nebraska only di-
rects a quarter of the state’s available TANF funds to direct cash assistance. See
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, NEBRASKA TANF SPENDING (2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/tanf_spending_ne.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/J55U-MQU9].
167. DAVID COOPER, BALANCING PAYCHECKS AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 17 (2016); see also
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, IMPROVING SNAP AND MEDICAID ACCESS:
FILLING INCOME ELIGIBILITY GAPS TO MAXIMIZE HEALTH COVERAGE (2020), https://
www.cbpp.org/research/health/improving-snap-and-medicaid-access-filling-in-
come-eligibility-gaps-to-maximize [https://perma.unl.edu/KM44-6S69] (demon-
strating that the eligibility gap likewise exists in Medicaid coverage).
168. See NEB. APPLESEED, BASIC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT EMPLOYMENT FIRST
ACTIONS (2015), https://neappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trifold—
EJ—EF-Sanctions—20151208.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/E9UF-R7JW].
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outside of the family home, more must be done to protect the due pro-
cess rights of families in these cases. The holdings of the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits, that due process rights do not attach to voluntary,
non-court agreements, are not practicable when the inherent coercion
of the child welfare system is considered in its entirety. External
checks on the non-court system as well as regulatory language which
outlines explicit non-court terms, standards, and procedures are nec-
essary to ensure non-court arrangements are truly voluntary and con-
stitutional rights are protected. Lastly, robust investment in economic
assistance programs may reduce poverty and prevent families from
entering the child welfare system altogether.
